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1.  Introduction 
  The economic analysis of intellectual property rights (IPRs) has long emphasized their 
ability to provide a solution to the appropriability and free-rider problems that beset the 
competitive provision of innovations (see Scotchmer, 2004, for an overview).  But whereas there 
is agreement that legally provided rights and institutions are necessary to offer suitable 
incentives for inventive and creative activities, it is less clear what the extent of such rights 
should be.  The predicament here is very much related to the second-best nature of the proposed 
solution to the market failures that arise in this context (Arrow, 1962).  Because they work by 
creating a degree of monopoly power, IPRs introduce a novel source of distortions.  Whereas 
the prospect of monopoly profits can be a powerful ex ante incentive for the would-be innovator, 
and can bring about innovations that would not otherwise take place, the monopoly position 
granted by the exclusivity of IPRs is inefficient from an ex post point of view (the innovation is 
underutilized).  This is the essential economic trade-off of most IPR systems: there are dynamic 
gains due to more powerful innovation incentives, but there are static losses because of a 
restricted use of innovations (Nordhaus, 1969). 
  The trade-off of IPR systems is more acute when one considers that new products and 
processes are themselves the natural springboard for more innovations and discoveries 
(Scotchmer, 1991).  When innovation is cumulative, the first inventor is not necessarily 
compensated for her contribution to the social value created by subsequent inventions.  This 
problem is particularly evident when the first invention constitutes basic research (perhaps 
leading to so-called research tools) that is not directly of interest to final users.  To address this 
intertemporal externality requires the transfer of profits from successful applications of a given 
patented innovation to the original inventor(s).  What the features of an IPR system should be 
to achieve that has been addressed in a number of studies.  Green and Scotchmer (1995) 
consider how patent breadth and patent length should be set in order to allow the first inventor 
to cover her cost, subject to the constraint that the second-generation innovation is profitable, 
and highlight the critical role of licensing.  This and related studies, including Scotchmer 
(1996), and Matutes, Regibeau, and Rockett (1996), can be viewed as supporting strong patent 
protection for the initial innovations.  Somewhat different conclusions can emerge, however, 
when the two innovation stages are modeled as research and development (R&D) races 
(Denicolò, 2000).    
  A critical issue, in this setting, relates to how one models the features of an IPR system, 
and the foregoing studies emphasize the usefulness of the concepts of “patentability” and 
“infringement.”  For instance, in the two-period model of Green and Scotchmer (1995), both 
innovations are presumed patentable, and the question is whether or not the second innovation   2
should be considered as infringing on the original discovery.   The notion of patentability refers 
broadly to the “novelty” and “nonobviousness” requirements of the patents statute (so that, as in 
O’Donoghue (1998) and Hunt (2004), one can define the minimum innovation size required to 
get a patent).  On the other hand, the context for infringement is defined by the “breadth” of 
patent rights.  This property can be made especially clear in quality ladder models of sequential 
innovation through the notion of “leading breadth”—the minimum size of quality improvement 
that makes a follow-on innovation non-infringing (O’Donoghue, Scotchmer, and Thisse, 1998; 
Denicolò and Zanchettin, 2002).     
  By contrast, in this paper we study how the IPR system affects incentives in a sequential 
innovation setting by focusing on the “research exemption” or “experimental use” doctrine.  
When a research exemption exists, proprietary knowledge and technology can be used freely in 
others’ research programs aimed at developing a new product or process (which, if achieved, 
would in principle still be subject to patentability and infringement standards).  On the other 
hand, if a research exemption is not envisioned, the mere act of trying to improve on an existing 
product may be infringing (regardless of success and/or commercialization of the second-
generation product).  In the U.S. patent system there is no general statutory research 
exemption, and, as clarified by the 2002 Madey v. Duke University decision by the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), the experimental use defense against infringement 
based on case law precedents can only be construed as extremely narrow (Eisenberg, 2003).  On 
the other hand, a special research exemption is contemplated for pharmaceutical drugs as part of 
the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, whereby firms intending to market generic 
pharmaceuticals are exempted from patent infringement for the purpose of developing 
information necessary to gain federal regulatory approval.1 Furthermore, a few specialized 
intellectual property statutes—including the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act and the 1984 
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act—contemplate a well-defined research exemption.  Indeed, 
the innovation environment and the intellectual property context for plants offer perhaps the 
sharpest characterization of the possible implications of a research exemption in a sequential 
setting, and we will consider them in more detail in what follows.   
  The intense debate that followed the CAFC ruling in Madey has renewed interest in the 
desirability of a research exemption in patent law (Thomas, 2004).  Quite clearly, a broad 
research exemption may have serious consequences for the profitability of innovations from 
basic research, thereby adversely affecting the incentives for R&D in some industries that rely 
extensively on research tools (e.g., biotechnology).  On the other hand, there is the concern that 
                                                    
1  The recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, in Merck v. Integra, appears not only to uphold 
but also to extend the scope of the Hatch-Waxman experimental use defense (Feit, 2005).   3
limiting the experimental use of proprietary knowledge in research may have a negative effect 
on the resulting flow of innovations.  Explicit economic modeling of the research exemption, 
however, appears to be lacking.  In this paper we propose to contribute to the economic analysis 
of the research exemption in IPR systems by focusing on the case of strictly sequential and 
cumulative innovations.  
  The quality ladder model developed in this paper draws upon the modeling approach of 
Bessen and Maskin (2002), while conceptually it belongs to the line of research on the optimal 
patent breadth discussed earlier.  Bessen and Maskin find that it might be optimal, both from 
the social and individual firm’s point of view, to have weak patent protection when innovation is 
cumulative.  This result is driven by a critical complementarity assumption, in particular that 
the improvement possibilities on the quality ladder are exhausted if all firms fail to innovate in 
any given period (implying that having rivals engaged in R&D might, in principle, be 
beneficial).  We depart from the Bessen and Maskin setup by formulating a fully dynamic model 
of an infinite-horizon stochastic innovation race suitable for an explicit characterization of 
equilibrium. To do so, we find it desirable to formulate the “complementarities” between firms 
somewhat differently.  Specifically, in our formulation the quest for the next innovation step 
does not end when both firms are unsuccessful (both can try again).  
  Related literature includes formal models of dynamic R&D competition between firms 
engaged in “patent races.”2 As with most contributions in this setting, we postulate a 
memoryless stochastic arrival of innovation; to keep a closer connection with the setup of 
Bessen and Maskin (2002), we model that process by means of a geometric distribution, rather 
than with exponential distribution typically used when modeling R&D races (e.g., Reinganum, 
1989). More importantly, in our model we delineate precisely the differences between the two 
IPR modes of interest (i.e., patents with and without the research exemption).  In most R&D 
dynamic competition models, on the other hand, the nature of the underlying intellectual 
property regime is not addressed explicitly and IPR effects are often captured by a generic 
winner-takes-all condition.  In addition, in our model both the incumbent and challenger can 
perform R&D, production takes place alongside R&D, and the stage payoffs are state-dependent 
(an attractive feature, in a quality ladder setting, under typical market structures). Conversely, 
to keep the analysis tractable, here we consider a fixed number of firms (two) and thus we 
neglect the issue of entry in the R&D contest that has been prominent in many previous studies.  
We also assume away the inefficiency of the static patent-monopoly case, as in other studies in 
                                                    
2  We cannot begin to do justice to this copious literature. See Tirole (1988, chapter 10) for an 
introduction. 
   4
this area, but still allow for dynamic welfare spillovers to consumers via a Bertrand competition 
assumption.        
In what follows we first discuss in some detail the intellectual property environment for 
plants, a context that provides perhaps the sharpest example of the possible implications of a 
research exemption.  We then develop a new game-theoretic model of sequential innovation 
that captures the stylized features of the problem at hand.  The model is solved by relying on 
the notion of Markov perfect equilibrium under the two distinct intellectual property regimes of 
interest.  The results permit a first investigation of the dynamic incentive issues entailed by the 
existence of a research exemption provision in intellectual property law.  First, we find that the 
firms themselves always prefer (ex ante) the full patent protection regime (unlike what happens 
in Bessen and Maskin, 2002).  The social ranking of the two intellectual property regimes, on 
the other hand, depends on the relative magnitudes of the costs of initial innovation and 
improvements.  It must be noted, as will become apparent below, that our model makes a stark 
assumption about the nature of the IP regime without a research exemption provision (i.e., the 
winner of the first innovation race faces no further R&D competition), which in principle should 
bias our results in favor of the research exemption. But even within this stylized framework, we 
still find that the research exemption need not result in higher social welfare. In particular, the 
research exemption is most likely to provide inadequate incentives when there is a large cost to 
establish a research program (as is arguably the case for the plant breeding industry where 
developing a new variety typically takes several years). On the other hand, when both initial and 
improvement costs are small relative to the expected profits (perhaps the case of the software 
industry noted by Bessen and Maskin, 2002), the weaker incentive to innovate is immaterial 
(firms engage in R&D anyway) and the research exemption regime dominates. 
 
2.  A Model of Sequential and Cumulative Innovation 
  We develop an infinite-horizon production and R&D contest between two firms under 
two possible IPR regimes—that is, with and without the research exemption. The model that 
we construct is sequential and cumulative and reflects closely the stylized features of plant 
breeding.  This industry is also of interest because, as mentioned, it has access to a sui generis 
IPR system that contemplates a well-defined research exemption.   
 
2.1.  Plant Variety Protection, Patents, and the “Research Exemption” 
  The Plant Variety Protection (PVP) Act of 1970 introduced a form of IPR protection for 
sexually reproducible plants that complemented that for asexually reproduced plants of the 
1930 Plant Patent Act and represented the culmination of a quest to provide IPRs for   5
innovations thought to lie outside the statutory subject matter of utility patents (Bugos and 
Kevles, 1992).   PVP certificates, issued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, afford exclusive 
rights to the varieties’ owners that are broadly similar to those provided by patents, including 
the standard 20-year term, with two major qualifications: there is a “farmer’s privilege,” that is, 
seed of protected varieties can be saved by farmers for their own replanting; and, more 
interestingly for our purposes, there is a “research exemption,” meaning that protected varieties 
may be used by other breeders for research purposes (Roberts, 2002).  In addition to PVP 
certificates, to assert their intellectual property, plant innovators can rely on trade secrets, the 
use of hybrids, and specific contractual arrangements (such as bag-label contracts).  More 
importantly, in the United States plant breeders can now also rely on utility patents.  The 
landmark 1980 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty opened the door for 
patent rights for virtually any biologically based invention and, in its 2001 J.E.M. v. Pioneer 
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that plant seeds and plants themselves (both traditionally 
bred or produced by genetic engineering) are patentable under U.S. law (Janis and Kesan, 2002).   
  As noted earlier, the U.S. patent law does not have a statutory research exemption (apart 
from the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act discussed earlier).  Hence, a plant breeder who 
elects to rely on patents can prevent others from using the protected germplasm in rivals’ 
breeding programs.  That is not possible when the protection is afforded by PVP certificates.  
The question then arises as to which IPR system is best for plant innovation, and whether the 
recently granted access to utility patents significantly changed the innovation incentives for 
U.S. plant breeders.  Alternatively, one can consider the differences in the degrees of protection 
conferred by patents and PVPs in an international context.  Rights similar to those granted by 
PVP certificates, known generically as “plant breeder’s rights” (PBRs), are available for plant 
innovations in most other countries, but patents are not (Le Buanec, 2004).  Indeed, under the 
TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights) agreement of the World Trade 
Organization, it is not mandatory for a signatory country to offer patent protection for plant 
and animal innovations, as long as a sui generis system (such as that of PBRs) is available 
(Moschini, 2004).  Thus, in many countries (including most developing countries), PBRs are the 
only available intellectual property protection for plant varieties.3 
  Given the structural differences between patents and PBRs, the notion of a research 
exemption is clearly central to this intellectual property context. Furthermore, it is interesting 
to note that the prototypical sequential and cumulative nature of R&D in plant breeding can be 
                                                    
3  Even in European countries, where plant innovations are included in the patentable subject 
matter, somewhat anachronistically, plant varieties per se are explicitly not patentable by the 
statute of the European Patent Office (Fleck and Baldock, 2003).   6
closely represented by a quality ladder model.  Plant breeding is a lengthy and risky endeavor 
that has been defined as consisting of developing new genetic diversity (e.g., new varieties) by 
the reassembling of existing diversity. Thus, the process is both sequential and cumulative, 
because new varieties would seek to maintain the desirable features of the ones they are based 
on while adding new attributes.  As such, a critical input in this process is the starting 
germplasm (whole genome), and that in turn is critically affected by whether or not one has 
access to existing successful varieties, which in turn is directly affected by a research exemption.  
In a dynamic context, of course, the quality of the existing germplasm is itself the result of 
(previous) breeding decisions, and so it is directly affected by the features of the IPR regime in 
place.  Industry views on the matter highlight the possibility that freer access to others’ 
germplasm will erode the incentive for critical pre-breeding activities aimed at widening the 
germplasm diversity base (Donnenwirth, Grace, and Smith, 2004).   
 
2.2.  Model Outline 
  We consider two firms that are competing to develop a new product variety along a 
particular development trajectory.  At time zero both firms have access to the same germplasm 
and, upon investing an amount  0 c , achieve success with probability  p  (each firm’s outcome is 
independent of the other’s).  We refer to the pursuit of the first innovation as the “Initial 
Game.”  Note that in this model the R&D process is costly and risky, and that the two firms are 
identical ex ante (i.e., the game is symmetric).  If at least one firm is successful, the initial game 
terminates and a patent is awarded.  When only one firm is successful, that firm gets the patent.  
When both firms are successful, the patent is randomly awarded (with equal probability) to one 
of them.  If neither firm is successful, they have the option of trying again, which would require 
a new investment of  0 c .   
  Given at least one success, the contest moves to the production and improvement stage, 
which we call the “Improvement Game.”  At the start of this game, firms are asymmetric: one 
of them, referred to as the “Leader,” has been successful (and holds the patent) whereas the other 
firm, referred to as the “Follower,” has not (does not).  There are two relevant activities that 
characterize the improvement game: rent extraction through production, and further R&D 
efforts.  Rent extraction is the prerogative of the Leader: specifically, the leading firm captures a 
return of Δ  in the first period of the improvement game.  What happens to the distribution of 
rent after the first period may depend on possible R&D undertaken in the improvement game, 
and that, in turn, depends on the property rights conveyed by the patent awarded at the end of 
the initial game.  For the latter, we distinguish between two prototypical IPR regimes that 
differ according to the treatment reserved for the research exemption.  The R&D structure of   7
the improvement game is similar to that of the initial game: upon an initial investment, a firm 
achieves the next improvement with probability  p .  But to recognize that the initial innovation 
is “more important” in some well-defined sense, we assume that the per-period cost of R&D in 
the improvement game is  0 cc ≤ .  
  Whether or not both firms can participate in the improvement game depends on the 
nature of IPRs, specifically on whether or not a “research exemption” is contemplated.  The first 
regime that we consider, which we refer to as “Full Patent” (FP), presumes that the patent 
awards an exclusive right to the patent holder, such that further innovations can be pursued 
only by the patent holder (or upon a license by the patent holder).  Thus, the FP regime 
characterizes the environment of U.S. utility patents which, as discussed earlier, envisions an 
extremely limited role for a research exemption.  The second regime, which we refer to as the 
“Research Exemption” (RE), allows any firm (i.e., including the Follower) to pursue the next 
innovation, although the patent gives the right of rent extraction (i.e., collecting Δ  in the 
current period) to the holder of the patent.  Hence, the RE regime reflects the attributes of a 
PBR system, such as the one implemented in the United States under the PVP Act.  We should 
note that both patents and PBRs confer rights that are limited in time (20 years).  But because 
we are characterizing the differences between the two regimes, without much loss of generality 
we ignore this feature and model both rights as having, in principle, infinite duration.  
  Under the FP regime, therefore, only the patent holder can pursue further innovations.  
Ignoring the possibility of licensing (we will return to this issue later), we model the 
improvement game under the FP regime as a monopoly undertaking by the firm that won the 
initial game.  Under the RE regime, on the other hand, both firms are allowed to participate in 
the follow-up R&D.  Because under the RE both firms can use the same starting point, upon a 
success in the first improvement game we either have the Leader owning two consecutive 
innovations or the Follower being the successful firm and thereby becoming the Leader. We 
emphasize again that the foregoing structure reflects the strict sequential and cumulative nature 
of the innovation process that we wish to model: the current quality level is, in effect, an 
essential input into the production of the next quality level. 
  Each additional innovation is worth an additional Δ , per period, to society.4  What a 
success is worth to the innovator, however, depends on the IPR regime and on the possible 
constraining effects of competition among innovators.  We make the simplifying assumption 
that only the best product is sold in this market, but what the owner can charge is the marginal 
                                                    
4  Because in our model we capture the asymmetry between initial innovation and follow-up 
improvements by postulating different R&D costs ( 0 c  and c ), we assume that the value of each 
successive quality improvement is the same.    8
value over what the competitor can offer (i.e., we assume Bertrand competition).  For example, if 
two firms have achieved n  and m  innovation steps, respectively, with mn > , the firm with m  
steps will be the one selling any product and will make an ex post per-period profit of ( ) m n −Δ .    
  To summarize, we consider an infinite-horizon R&D contest between two firms under 
two possible IPR regimes.  Under the FP regime, both firms can participate in the initial game, 
but only the successful firm can be engaged in the improvement games.  Under the RE regime, 
both firms can participate in both the initial game and the improvement games. 
 
2.3.  The Stochastic Game 
  To formalize the model outlined in the foregoing as an infinite-horizon R&D stochastic 
game, the set of players (the two firms) is  { } 1,2 G ≡ .  At each stage  {0,1,2,....} t =  of the initial 
game, labeled  0 Γ , the two firms simultaneously choose an action 
i
t a  from the history-invariant 
action set  { } , A IN ≡ , where I  = invest and N = no investment.  Action I  entails a cost to the 
firm of  0 0 c >  and brings success with probability  (0,1) p∈  if the other firm does not invest, 
whereas it brings success with probability  (0, ) q p ∈  if the other firm also invests.  Specifically, 
when both firms invest, and firms’ outcomes are independent, the probability of at least one 
success is 
2 1 (1 ) p −− , and thus  (2) 2 qp p ≡− .  At the beginning of the initial game, firms are 
identical and the game is symmetric. After a single “success,” the firms will be asymmetric for 
the rest of the game.  Under the FP regime, the loser of the initial game drops out and the 
winner becomes a monopolist in both the exploitation of the innovation and in further R&D 
activities.  Under the RE regime, on the other hand, both firms can participate in the 
improvement game. If a firm chooses to invest in any period of the improvement game, the 
required cost is  [ ] 0 0, c c ∈ , and the success probabilities are just as in the initial game (i.e., a 
single firm innovates with probability  p , and when both firms invest, each wins the contest 
with probability q ).   
  The improvement game under the FP regimes is technically not a game because there are 
no strategic interactions (the winner of the initial game is a monopolist).  Under the RE regime, 
on the other hand, we actually have a family of improvement games, which we label as  k Γ , with 
each distinguished by the number  1,2,3,... k =  of successive innovation steps held by the 
Leader.  Thus, after the first innovation we have  1 k = .  If the Leader is the firm that innovates 
again then we have  2 k =  and the status of each firm does not change.  Whenever the Follower 
wins the stage game, however, then firms swap their roles (e.g., the Follower becomes the   9
Leader) and the number of steps ahead that determines the payoff drops back to  1 k = .  Hence, 
1, 2,3,... k =  represents one of the “state” variables of the game.   Figure 1 provides an 
illustration.  Note that, in this setup, the RE regime ensures that “leapfrogging” is possible, 
although the Leader’s advantage can also accumulate and persist, whereas with the FP regime 
there is “persistence” of the monopoly position provided by the initial innovation.5 
  Stage payoffs are determined under a Bertrand competition assumption.  Specifically, 
under either regime, in each period the last firm to be successful (the Leader) collects an amount 
kΔ , where  c Δ>  measures the per-period value of a stage innovation, and  {1,2,3,...} k ∈  
denotes the total number of innovation steps that the leading firm has over the competitor.  The 
value of the entire game to the firms, from the perspective of the initial period and under the 




















                                                    
5  These are two recurrent concepts in patent race models (Tirole, 1988, chapter 10).  The 
persistence of monopoly was studied by, among others, Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and 
Reinganum (1983).  The notion of leapfrogging was introduced by Fudenberg et al. (1983).  
Whereas our model does not focus on these two issues, it does emphasize that they may be 
directly affected by the specific features of the relevant IPR system. 
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3. Equilibria in the Improvement Games 
  We characterize the equilibrium solution of the improvement games first and, by standard 
backward induction principles, analyze the initial games next, under both IPR regimes that we 
h a v e  d e s c r i b e d .   A s  e x p l a i n e d  i n  m o r e  d e t a i l  i n  w h a t  f o l l o w s ,  w e  w i l l  f o c u s  o n  “ M a r k o v  
strategies,” whereby the history of the game is allowed to affect strategies only through state 
variables that summarize the payoff-relevant attributes of the strategic environment (Fudenberg 
and Tirole, 1991, chapter 13).  Thus, our equilibrium concept will be that of Markov Perfect 
Equilibrium (MPE), that is, a profile of Markov strategies that yields a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium (Maskin and Tirole, 2001).   
 
3.1.  Improvement Game under the Full Patent Regime 
  As noted, here we do not really have a game, just an optimization problem where, at each 
stage, the firm that is allowed to invest has to choose an action from { , } I N . Such a firm is 
effectively a monopolist in the improvement game.  If it chooses action  I  at any one stage, 
success will occur with probability  p  and hence the expected payoff to choosing action  I  in 
that stage is  (1 ) cp δδ −+ Δ −  (because success yields a stage payoff Δ  forever starting with the 
next period). Hence action  I  is optimal in any one stage i.f.f.  0 (1 ) c p x δδ Δ≤ − ≡ .  Naturally, 
if it is optimal for such a monopolist to choose action I  at any one stage, then it is optimal to do 
so in every stage and hence the investment rule does not depend on k . If the condition 
0 cx Δ≤  for the optimality of action  I  holds, the expected payoff of the patent holder at the 












    .         ( 1 )  
If, on the other hand,  0 cx Δ> , then the patent holder’s optimal action would be N  and the 
payoff would be  () () 1 M Vk k δ =Δ − . 
 
3.2.  Improvement Game(s) under the Research Exemption Regime 
  In the improvement game under the RE regime, firms are asymmetric.  The firm with the 
last success is the Leader who can earn returns from the market (in proportion to the number of 
extra innovation steps that it has relative to the competitor, which we have denoted as k ).  The 
other firm, labeled as the Follower, does not earn current returns but has the same 
opportunities to engage in R&D as the other firm.  As discussed earlier,  1, 2,3,... k =  represents 
one of the “state” variables of the game.  The other state variable of the game is the identity of   11
the Leader,  { } 1,2 G ∈≡ A .  Together, ( , ) k A  summarize all the payoff-relevant information of the 
history of the game leading up to any particular subgame. 
  We consider only Markov strategies, so that the strategy of a firm depends only on the 
state of the game.  The state space of the game is SG ≡× `, where G  is the set of players 
defined earlier, and  { } 1,2,... ≡ `  is the set of natural numbers.  A Markov strategy here is 
defined as a function  [ ] : 0,1 i S σ → ,  iG ∈ .  Specifically, the strategy  ( , ) i k σ A  tells us the 
probability that player i  will attach to action I  when the state is ( , ) k A .  Thus, at any stage of 
the game with the same state, the Markov strategy  i σ  specifies the same probability 
distribution over available actions.  Although the use of Markov strategies is somewhat 
restrictive, it is standard in the dynamic oligopoly models in general and in the models of 
innovation races in particular (e.g., Bar, 2006; Hörner, 2004).   
  Alternatively, we can characterize the strategy of the two “types” of firms.  Conditional on 
being a Leader, the only payoff-relevant state is the number of innovation steps k  that the 
Leader has over the Follower.  Similarly, conditional on being the Follower, the only relevant 
state is again the number of innovations steps k  that the Leader is enjoying.  [Note: the stage 
and continuation payoffs to the Follower actually do not depend on k .  But because k  affects 
the Leader’s payoffs, a Markov strategy for the Follower must also condition on k .]  Thus, 
with some abuse of notation, we can write the strategy of the Leader as  () L k σ and the strategy 
of the Follower as  () F k σ .6   
  At any stage of the game, the expected payoff of a firm for the subgame starting at that 
point, for given strategies of the two firms, depends on the firm being a Leader or a Follower.  
For given strategies of the two firms, the payoff to the Follower does not depend on how many 
steps behind the Follower is lagging the Leader.  The payoff to the Leader, on the other hand, 
does depend on the number of leads it has.  Thus, for a given strategy profile  ( , ) L F σσ σ ≡ , for 
the game  k Γ  we can write the payoff to the Follower as  ( , ) F LF V σσ  and the payoff to the 
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6  Hörner (2004) similarly uses Markov strategies where the state space is the set of integers.  
But note that the stage payoff in Hörner depends only on whether the firm is a Leader or a 
Follower, whereas in our model stage payoffs (kΔ ) are state-dependent.   12
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  As discussed earlier, we have a family of improvement games  k Γ , each of which differs 
only in the number of improvement steps that the Leader has over the Follower—the number 
k  that identifies the state variable of the game.  Under our Bertrand pricing assumption, only 
the highest quality of the product is sold in the market and the per-period (gross) return to the 
firm selling it is kΔ . To find the MPE we start with the simplest case in which 
( )( ) 1 LF kk σσ ==  for all 1, 2,... k = .  
 
Lemma 1. Suppose that, in the improvement game with a research exemption,  ( ) 1 L k σ =  and 
[ ] ( )0 , 1 F k σφ =∈ , for all  1, 2,... k =  . Then,   
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  .    (5)   
 
The proof of this result is confined to the Appendix. Thus, when the Leader invests in every 
period with probability one while the Follower invests with the same probability  [ ] 0,1 φ∈  in 
every period, Lemma 1 provides close-form expression for the value of being the Leader or the 
Follower (conditional on the constant, but arbitrary, mixing probability φ ). These expressions 
will prove useful in establishing the MPE for the improvement game claimed in Proposition 1. 
Note that the value to being the Follower does not depend on the number of leads possessed by 
the Leader.  This is because, if successful in the stage R&D race, the new Leader obtains a one-
step lead over the other firm (under our Bertrand pricing assumption). The value to being a 
Leader, on the other hand, increases with k , the number of improvement steps of the Leader 
not matched by the Follower, as well as being increasing in the stage payoff Δ  and decreasing 
in R&D cost c .  
  Next we establish a complete characterization of the conditions under which the Follower 
and/or the Leader actually invest in the equilibrium of the improvement games.  For that 
purpose, we define the threshold levels:  
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  .          ( 8 )  
Note that, under the assumed structure of the model,  012 x x x >>.  Given that, the firms’ 
equilibrium investment decisions in the improvement game are as follows. 
 
Proposition 1.   Then MPE of the improvement game satisfies the following conditions: 
(i)  If  2 cx Δ≤  then  ( ) 1 L k σ =  and  ( ) 1 F k σ =  for all  1, 2,... k = .  
(ii)  If  21 x c x ≤Δ ≤ then   ( ) 1 L k σ =  and  [ ] ( )0 , 1 F k σφ =∈  for all  1, 2,... k = . 
(iii) If  10 x c x ≤Δ ≤, then  ( ) 1 L k σ =  and  ( ) 0 F k σ =  for all  1, 2,... k = . 
(iv)   If  0 x c ≤Δ , then  ( )( ) 0 LF kk σσ ==  for all  1, 2,... k = . 
 
The proof, confined to the Appendix, relies on establishing that neither Leader nor Follower has 
a one-stage deviation from the proposed strategy that would increase his payoff. Because this 
game is continuous at infinity—that is, the difference between payoffs from any two strategy 
profiles will be arbitrary close to zero provided that these strategy profiles coincide for a 
sufficiently large number of periods starting from the beginning of the game—Theorem 4.2 in 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) implies that the proposed strategy profile is the MPE. 
  Thus, when the R&D cost c  is low enough, relative to the stage reward Δ , both firms 
invest with probability one in every stage.  In this case the value functions of the Leader and of 




























  .         ( 1 0 )  
Note that the value of being a Leader when  1 k >  is decreasing in the R&D success probability.  
Intuitively, when both firms engage in R&D in every period, the Leader with more than one 
step lead has more to lose than to gain from the R&D context.  As for the Follower,  0 F V →  as 
2 c x Δ→ .  But were the Follower to choose action N  for all  2 cx Δ≥ , the value to being a 
Leader would jump from  ( , ) L V k σ  as in equation (9) to  M V  as given in equation (1).  But then, if 
the firm that is a Follower in any one stage believes that future Followers always choose action   14
N , then by deviating to  I  in that stage, the firm would obtain a positive probability of 
becoming an uncontested Leader, with an associated strictly positive payoff.  Thus,  ( ) 0 F k σ =  
for all k  cannot be part of an equilibrium when  2 x c <Δ  but c Δ is close to  2 x .  The MPE in 
the domain  21 x c x ≤Δ ≤, therefore, entails the Follower’s use of a mixed strategy, whereby the 
Follower invests with probability  [ ] 0,1 φ∈  in all stages.  Specifically, as derived in the 
Appendix, the mixing probability φ  in this domain is the positive root that solves the quadratic 
equation 
() ( ) ( ) 1 1( 1)1( 1 ) 1( 1 2 )( 1) 0 cq q q q p δδ δ δ δ −−−+ −− + Δ −− +− = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ && & &  .      (11) 
At  1 cx Δ= , equation (11) yields  0 = & .  At this point the Follower drops out of the 
improvement game and only the Leader finds it profitable to invest.  In fact, it can be verified 
that, when evaluated at  1 cx Δ=  and  0 = & , the Leader’s payoff is equal to the monopolist’s 
payoff.  For  10 x c x ≤Δ ≤ only the Leader invests (with probability one) in the improvement 
stage, whereas for  0 x c <Δ  no firm invests. Thus, for  1 x c ≤Δ  the FP regime and the RE 
regimes are equivalent as far as the improvement game is concerned. 
  The conclusions of Proposition 1 are illustrated in Figure 2, which represents the type of 
equilibrium strategies that apply for various ranges of the parameter ratio c Δ.  When R&D is 
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too costly, relative to the expected payoff, no innovation takes place; the range of parameters 
that supports this outcome is the same under either regime (i.e.,  0 cx Δ> ) .   W i t h  a  m or e 
favorable cost/benefit ratio, the incumbent in the FP regime will find it worthwhile to engage in 
improvements.  In this parameter space the RE regime supports only one firm if  10 x c x <Δ ≤, 
and two firms if  1 0 cx ≤Δ ≤.   
The payoff to the two firms in this type of equilibrium is of some importance.  By using 
the expression in equation (4) of Lemma 1, and evaluating it at the φ , which solves the 
equilibrium condition in (11), we find that   0 F V =  in the domain  21 x c x ≤Δ ≤. The payoff to 













  .         ( 1 2 )  
Thus, in the domain  21 x c x ≤Δ ≤, the payoff to the Leader is increasing in the R&D cost c .  
That is, the gain from the weakening R&D competition (the Follower invests with a decreasing 
probability as c  increases) more than outweighs the direct negative impact of R&D cost.  That 
the Leader’s payoff must be increasing on some part of the domain when  2 x c ≤Δ  is clear when 
one notes that the monopolist’s payoff at  0 cx Δ=  and the Leader’s payoff at  2 cx Δ=  satisfy 
()
0 2 () (,)
(1 ) 1 (1 )









  .    (13) 
  The equilibrium payoff to the Leader and the Follower are illustrated in Figure 3. The 
threshold levels  0 x ,  1 x , and  2 x  that we have identified satisfy intuitive comparative statics 
properties, such as  012 0 xpxpxp ∂∂ > ∂∂ > ∂∂ >  and  012 0 xxx δδδ ∂∂ > ∂∂ > ∂∂ > .  More 
interestingly, the foregoing analysis shows that, in a well-defined sense, under the RE regime 
the Leader has a stronger incentive to invest in improvements than does the Follower.  This 
property of the MPE reflects the carrot-and-stick nature of the incentives at work here, what 
Beath, Katsoulacos, and Ulph (1989) call the “profit incentive” and the “competitive threat.”   
The carrot is the same for both contenders—a successful innovation brings an additional per-
period reward of Δ . But the stick differs. For the Follower, failure to innovate when the 
opponent is successful does not change its situation (recall that the value function of the 
Follower is invariant to the state of the game).  But for the Leader, failure to innovate when the 
opponent is successful implies the loss of the current gross returns kΔ .   
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4.  Equilibrium in the Initial Game 
  The initial investment game has a structure similar to that of the improvement game. The 
major differences are the following: (i) the cost of investment in R&D is equal to  0 cc ≥ ; (ii) both 
firms are in exactly the same position and the per-period profit flow in the investment game is 
equal to zero; and (iii) the game ends as soon as one of the firms obtains the first successful 
innovation.  We will consider the FP regime first. 
 
4.1. Full Patent Regime 
We find that the equilibrium depends critically on the postulated asymmetry between initial 
innovation and follow-on improvements.  To facilitate exposition, it is useful to refer to Figure 
4, which illustrates the parametric regions of the types of equilibria that arise.  The regions of 
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  .        ( 1 5 )  
For notational simplicity, let  0 σ  denote the strategy  () k σ  when  0 k = , that is, the probability 
of investment of a given firm in the initial investment game.  We can then state the following 
results (details of the proof are in the Appendix). 
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Figure 4.  
Equilibrium with  














Proposition 2.  The symmetric equilibrium of the investment game under the FP regime is 
given by the strategy profile 00 ( , ) σσ , where  0 σ  satisfies the following conditions: 
(i) If  0 / cx Δ> , then  0 0 σ = . 
(ii) If  0 / cx Δ≤  and  () 01 cH c Δ> Δ , then  0 0 σ = . 
(iii) If  0 / cx Δ≤ and  () 02 cH c Δ< Δ  , then  0 1 σ = . 













where  M V  is the value function, at the start of the first improvement game, for the patent holder 
who will be investing in every period (as derived in equation (1), with  1 k = ). 
 
As one would expect, for a given value of c , relatively low values of initial R&D cost  0 c  will 
induce both firms to invest with probability one, as in part (iii) of Proposition 2. If the R&D cost 
parameters c  and/or  0 c  are large enough (as in parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2), on the other 
hand, neither firm invests. For intermediate values of the R&D cost parameters, as exactly 
identified in part (iv) of Proposition 2, each firm would want to invest if the other does not. 
Thus, in addition to such pure-strategy equilibria, here we have a (symmetric) mixed-strategy 
/ c Δ
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equilibrium. Note that the mixed-strategy equilibrium converges to a pure-strategy equilibrium 
in the appropriate limit:  0 0 σ →  as  () 01 cH c Δ→ Δ  and  0 1 σ →  as  () 02 cH c Δ→ Δ . Thus, 
with respect to Figure 4, in equilibrium both firms randomize between investing and not when 
the parameter vector  0 ( /, /) cc ΔΔ  lies in the area labeled “mixed strategies,” and both firms 
invest with probability one when the parameter vector lies in the area labeled “pure strategies.”       
 
4.2.  Research Exemption Regime 
  The equilibrium of the investment game under the RE regime similarly depends on the 
relative magnitude of the R&D costs that characterize the initial innovation as opposed to the 
follow-on improvements. As derived earlier, under RE regime one can distinguish three 
intervals of values of  / c Δ  in which the strategy of the Follower and the resulting equilibrium 
in the improvement stage is qualitatively different:  2 [0, ] x ,  21 [ , ] x x  and  10 [ , ] x x . In what follows 
we will analyze the equilibrium of the initial stage in these cases. The various possibilities that 
arise are illustrated in Figure 5, where the parametric regions of interest are defined by the 
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Functions  3() Hx  and  4() Hx  determine the threshold levels of  0 c  and the resulting strategy 
profiles for a given value of  2 ( /)[ 0 , ] c x Δ∈ , and the function  5() Hx  does the same for the 
parametric region  21 ( /)[,] c xx Δ∈ . The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium of 
the investment game under the RE regime for all values of  1 / cx Δ≥ . 
 
Proposition 3.  Suppose that  1 / cx Δ≥ . Then the strategy profile  00 ( , ) σσ  constitutes the 
symmetric equilibrium of the investment game under the research exemption regime i.f.f. it 
satisfies the following conditions: 
(i) If  0 / cx Δ> , then  0 0 σ = . 
(ii) If  10 / x c x ≤Δ ≤ and  () 01 cH c Δ> Δ , then  0 0 σ = . 
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Figure 5.  
















The results of this proposition follow directly from observing that, as was shown in Proposition 
1, when  1 / cx Δ≥  the Follower does not invest at the improvement stage. This implies that 
payoffs of the Leader and the Follower are identical to the payoffs of the patent holder and of 
the firm that did not innovate under the FP regime, respectively. Therefore the resulting 
equilibrium must also be identical to the one obtained under the FP regime (see Proposition 2). 
It is also readily verified that  21 1 () H x x = . This implies that there is no pure-strategy 
equilibrium in the investment game in this case.  
  Next we consider the interval  21 [ , ] x x . Recall that in this case both the Leader and the 
Follower take part in the improvement game, but the payoff of the Follower is equal to zero.  
The resulting equilibrium at the investment stage is characterized as follows.  
  
Proposition 4.  Suppose that  21 / x c x ≤Δ ≤ and let  1 ( ,1) L VV σ ≡  denote the payoff of the 
winner of the investment game (i.e., the first Leader), as given by equation (5). Then the 
strategy profile  00 ( , ) σσ  constitutes the symmetric equilibrium of the investment game under 
the research exemption regime i.f.f. it satisfies the following conditions: 
 
/ c Δ
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(i)  If  0 cc = , then  0 1 σ = . 












(iii) If  () 05 cH c Δ> Δ , then  0 0 σ = . 
 
The proof of this result is given in the Appendix. Thus, in the initial investment game we can 
have an equilibrium in which both firms invest with probability one even if  2 / x c ≤Δ  (that is, 
even though, at the improvement stage, under these conditions the Follower will only play a 
mixed strategy). 
  Finally, consider the case  2 ( /)[ 0 , ] c x Δ∈ , that is, when both the Leader and the Follower 
invest with probability one in the improvement stage.   
 
Proposition 5.  Suppose that  2 / cx Δ≤ . Then the strategy profile  00 ( , ) σσ  constitutes the 
symmetric equilibrium of the investment game under the research exemption regime i.f.f. it 
satisfies the following conditions: 
(i) If  () 04 cH c Δ≤ Δ , then  0 1 σ = . 
(ii)  If  () 03 cH c Δ> Δ , then  0 0 σ = . 
(iii) If  1 / cx Δ<  and  () () 40 3 Hc c Hc Δ≤ Δ ≤ Δ, then  0 01 σ ≤≤ .  
 
  The proof of the proposition is given in the Appendix, where the quadratic equation 
defining  0 σ  for part (iii) is also explicitly derived. With respect to Figure 5, therefore, pure 
strategies are used in the parameter regions labeled  1 C , and symmetric mixed strategies are 
used in regions  A,  1 B  and  2 C .  As one might expect, the equilibrium strategies in the initial 
game reflect the nature of equilibrium at the improvement stage. Recall that, in the 
improvement game, the Follower will not take part whenever  1 / cx Δ> .  If this condition is 
satisfied, once one of the firms succeeds in completing the first innovation step, its rival will 
immediately drop out of the race.  This type of equilibrium is similar to the one obtained by 
Fudenberg et al. (1983) in the context of a race with a known finish line, and by Hörner (2004) 
in an infinite-horizon setting.  Specifically, the incentives to invest in R&D is highest when the 
firms compete for the entire market, i.e., when the winner of the initial game faces no competition 
afterwards. In particular, note that whenever  1 / cx Δ< , no investment takes place if 
03 0 /( 0 ) c H x Δ≥ = .  But, when  10 / x c x <Δ < we can find a range of  0 / c Δ  such that  00 / cx Δ≥    21
and still both firms invest with positive probability in equilibrium, as can be seen with the aid of 
Figure 5. The same conclusion applies to the case 21 / x c x <Δ <, when the Leader faces a 
Follower that randomizes and does not invest with probability one in each period.  
  Comparing the equilibrium outcomes under the FT and RE regimes, we note that in the 
parameter regions  4 C  and  4 B  of Figure 5 we have no initial R&D investment under the RE 
regime, whereas the FP regime leads to some initial investment (given by the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium).  Similarly, in regions   3 C  and  3 B  of Figure 5 we again have no initial R&D  
investment under the RE regime, whereas under the FP regime both firms invest with 
probability one in the initial game.  Thus, it is apparent that the presence of an RE clause 
unambiguously weakens the initial incentive of firms to invest in R&D.  The welfare 
consequences of these weakened investment incentives are analyzed next.  
 
5. Welfare Analysis 
Having characterized the MPE of the model, we can now turn to the normative implications of 
the analysis.  We consider first the returns, from an ex ante perspective, to the two firms, and 
next derive the aggregate welfare of the economy.  
 
5.1.  Firms’ Expected Profit  
  The expected profit of the two firms at time zero, before the initial research investment  0 c  
is made, depends on the particular equilibrium solution that applies to the region of the 
parameter space.  The regions of interest (labeled  A,  1 B  to  4 B , and  1 C  to  4 C ) are illustrated in 
Figure 4.  Our findings are as follows. 
 
Proposition 6.    The firms’ expected profits under the FP regime are never lower, and can be 
strictly higher, than those under the RE regime.  Specifically: 
(i)  Firms’ expected profit under RE and FP regimes are the same if   () 02 / cH c Δ≥ Δ . 
(ii)  Firms’ expected profit under the FP regime is higher than under the RE regime  
 (a)  if  21 / x c x <Δ < and  () 02 / cH c Δ≤ Δ , 
  (b) if   2 / cx Δ<  and  () 02 / cH c Δ≤ Δ . 
 
The domain of part (i) of this proposition encompasses the parameter space labeled as  A, 2 B , 
4 B , and  4 C  in Figure 5.  In area A the firms have exactly the same equilibrium strategies under 
either regime (see Propositions 1, 2, and 3): in the improvement games only the Leader invests   22
whenever  1 cx Δ> .  Consequently, the firms have the same behavior in the initial game as well.  
The firms’ equilibrium strategy is to invest with probability one in the parameter space of area 
A (earning a positive expected payoff). In the area  4 C  there is no investment in the initial game 
under the RE regime, whereas firms invest with a mixed strategy under the FP regime (but 
earn a zero expected payoff). In area  2 B  firms randomize in the investment game under both 
regimes. Finally, in area  4 B  there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium under the FP regime and 
none of the firms invests under the RE regime.  For the domain of part (ii)(a), ex ante expected 
profits are positive under the FP regime and zero under the RE regime (because none of the 
firms invests in the investment game in area  3 B , and because firms randomize in area  1 B ). The 
domain of part (ii)(b) encompasses areas  1 C ,  2 C , and  3 C  in Figure 5.  Consider area  1 C  first.  
Under either regime, both firms invest with probability one in both the investment game and 
the improvement games.  Because firms have the same probability of success, it follows that 
both firms prefer the FP regime, ex ante, i.f.f.  M L F V VV ≥+. By using the expressions derived in 










         ( 1 9 )  
which is clearly satisfied.  Turning to the parameter space comprising area  2 C , we note that 
here firms invest with probability one in the FP regime, whereas they randomize in the mixed-
strategy equilibria under the RE regime.  The expression for the expected profit of each firm 
under the FP regime solves the recursive equation  00 0 (1 2 )
FPF P
M V cq V q V δδ =− + + − , and thus: 
  0
0 1 (1 2 )








  .          ( 2 0 )  
whereas under the RE regime expected profit is given by 
0
0








         ( 2 1 )  
where  0 σ  is the investment probability in the equilibrium mixed strategy. As shown in the 
Appendix, a sufficient condition for  00
FPR E V V >  holds.  Finally, for the parameter space of area 
3 C , firms invest with probability one in the initial game and enjoy a positive profit, whereas 
there is no investment (and zero profit) under the RE regime.  
  Thus, Proposition 6 establishes that firms, ex ante, would never prefer the RE regime over 
the FP regime.  This result differs from that of Bessen and Maskin (2002), where a (suitably 
defined) weaker patent system, in a similar sequential innovation setting, can produce higher ex   23
ante returns to the innovating firms than a full patent system.  The root of that result is a 
complementarity assumption that is appealing in a sequential setting: the presence of a 
competitor increases the probability that future profitable innovations (improvements) may be 
undertaken (although it erodes the firm’s expected profit in a given stage innovation race).  The 
former effects counter the latter (standard) effect and can lead to a firm benefiting from its 
innovation being used by others for future innovations. A flavor of Bessen and Maskin’s 
complementarity assumption is present in our model as well: prior to knowing the identity of 
the winner of the initial innovation stage, an RE may be appealing because it guarantees the 
possibility of taking part in future (profitable) innovation stages.  But the specific structure of 
the IPR regimes that we have modeled, and the explicit requirement of an MPE solution, in our 
setting ensure that the FP protection is preferred ex ante by the firms.  
 
5.2.  Welfare  
Because under the Bertrand pricing condition that we have used the sum of firms’ 
profits does not coincide with social welfare, we have to take into account consumer surplus 
when evaluating efficiency of patents and research exemptions. First we compute the expected 
social welfare starting at stage one of the improvement game. Let  i W  denote this welfare 
measure when there are i  firms ( 1,2 i = ) investing (in equilibrium) in every period of the game, 
and let Wφ  denote the corresponding welfare measure when the Leader invests with probability 
one and the Follower invests with probability φ , evaluated at the beginning of the 
improvement game. Clearly,  1 W  coincides with monopoly profits  M V  because the monopolist 
captures the entire surplus when it is the only one to invest in every period.  Hence,   









.         ( 2 2 )  
  On the other hand, the situation in which two firms invest in every period from the social 
point of view is the same as the situation in which there is a monopolist with cost 2c  and 
success probability 2qp >  that invests in every period. Hence the sum of firms’ profits and 
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The measure of social welfare when the Follower randomizes between investing and not can be 
shown to be given by the following expression (see the Appendix for an explicit derivation): 
   2
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Note that, as one would expect, when  0 φ =  we have  1 W W φ = , and when  1 φ =  we have 
2 W W φ = . Similarly to the analysis of the equilibrium of the investment game, we will compare 
welfare under the two IPR regimes in the three possible cases:  2 ( /)[ 0 , ] c x Δ∈ ,  21 ( /)[,] c xx Δ∈  
and  10 ( /)[, ] c xx Δ∈ . Note that for the case  10 ( /)[, ] c xx Δ∈ , we have shown that the 
equilibrium strategies of firms are exactly the same in both regimes. This implies that the social 
payoffs are equal. It turns out that in the two remaining cases it is possible to characterize social 
welfare ranking only for a subset of the domain of possible values of () 0 / ,/ cc ΔΔ . We present 
these analytic results in the following two propositions and then perform numerical analysis of 
the remaining cases. 
 
Proposition 7.  Suppose that  2 / [0, ] c x Δ∈ . The social payoffs under the RE and FP regimes 
are related as follows:  
(i) If  () () 30 2 Hc c Hc Δ< Δ < Δ, then the FP regime yields higher welfare.  
(ii)  If  () 04 cH c Δ≤ Δ , then 
  (a)  if (1) ( 2) ( 1) pp δδ −− ≥ − , the RE regime yields a higher welfare; 
 (b)  if  (1) ( 2) ( 1) pp δδ −− < −, the FP regime gives higher social welfare if  
   01 (1 ) p xc x −< Δ ≤  but the RE regime yields higher welfare if   0 0 (1 ) c p x ≤Δ ≤− . 
 
For the case of part (i), with FP protection both firms invest with probability one; hence, the 
social payoff is positive and greater than the social payoff with the RE (which is zero because 
none of the firms invests in equilibrium).  For part (ii), here both firms invest with probability 
one in both investment and improvement games. The question of whether the RE is better than 
the FP regime is essentially the same as the question of whether it is better to have two firms 
(as under the RE regime) or one firm (as under the FP regime) in the improvement game.  
Thus, the RE regime yields higher welfare i.f.f.    21 W W ≥ , that is, whenever 
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We know that in this region   1 / cx Δ< . We conclude that in this region the RE regime will 













   ⇔  (1) ( 2) ( 1) pp δδ −− ≥ − .     (26) 
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Proposition 8.  Suppose that  21 / [,] c xx Δ∈ . The social payoffs under the RE and FP regimes 
are related as follows:  
(i)  For all values of () 0 / ,/ cc ΔΔ  that satisfy the condition  () () 50 2 Hc c Hc Δ< Δ < Δ 
(region  3 B ) the FP regime yields higher welfare.  
(ii) For all values of () 0 / ,/ cc ΔΔ  that satisfy the condition  () () 20 5 Hc c Hc Δ< Δ < Δ 
(region  2 B ) the RE regime yields higher welfare. 
(iii) For all values of () 0 / ,/ cc ΔΔ  that satisfy  ()() { } () 25 0 1 max , Hc Hc c Hc ΔΔ < Δ < Δ , 
that is, region  4 B , there is no difference in welfare between the two IP regimes. 
 
For the parameter region of part (i), with FP protection both firms invest with probability one; 
hence, the social payoff is positive and greater than the social payoff with the RE, which is equal 
to zero because none of the firms invests in equilibrium.  For part (ii), firms randomize in the 
investment game under both IP regimes. Even though expected profits are zero under both IP 
regimes, the RE regime yields a higher welfare because firms do not appropriate the whole 
consumer surplus (under our Bertrand pricing assumption).  Finally, for part (iii), firms 
randomize under the FP regime (earning zero expected profit), and there is no investment 
under the RE regime. We conclude that welfare is equal to zero in both cases. 
 
5.3.  An Illustration 
  Propositions 8 and 9 do not say anything conclusive about the welfare ranking of the two 
IPR regimes when the parameters of interest fall in areas  2 C  and  1 B  of Figure 5. It turns out 
that either welfare ranking is possible in these areas, depending on parameter values. That much 
can easily be established by deriving explicit expressions for the welfare functions of interest 
that are then numerically evaluated for alternative parameter values. Suppose that both firms 
invest with probability  0 σ  in the investment game. Then the expected social payoff of the whole 
game, labeled  00 () W σ , is defined by the following recursive equation: 
()
() ( ) ()( )
2
00 0 0 00
2
00 0 0 0 00 0
() 2 2 ( 1 2 )
21 ( 1) 1
i
i
Wc q W q W
cp W p W W
σσ δ δσ
σσ δ δ σ σ δ σ
=− + + − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
+ − −+ +− +− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
 (27) 
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where  i W  is equal to either  1 W ,  2 W , or Wφ , depending on the equilibrium of the improvement 
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     (30) 
where in (30)  i W  is equal to either  2 W  or Wφ . 
  These welfare functions can now be compared for any given set of parameter values (upon 
calculation of the equilibrium mixed-strategy parameter  0 σ ).  Consider, for example,  1 Δ=  
(without loss of generality), and suppose that  0.5 p =  and  0.8 δ = .7  The welfare comparison of 
the two IPR regimes that we obtain in this case is summarized in Figure 6 where, for 
concreteness, the various regions are drawn to scale (i.e., given  0.5 p =  and  0.8 δ = ).    
 
 
Figure 6.  
Welfare comparisons   














                                                    
7  These parameter values broadly reflect the nature of plant breeding, where the probability of 
success of a research program may be good, but where it usually takes several years to bring a 
new variety to the market.  For example,  0.8 δ =  corresponds to a research period of five years 
if the annual discount rate is approximately equal to 4.5 percent. 



















The un-shaded regions in Figure 6 (labeled E  ) represent the parameter space where the FP 
and RE regimes are equivalent in terms of social welfare. In the rightmost portion of this 
parameter space (region A in Figure 5) there is no difference in welfare because the equilibrium 
is the same under the two intellectual property regimes. In the other portion of this parameter 
space, welfare equivalence results because no investment takes place under the RE regime, 
whereas under the FP regime all the surplus is competed away by the two firms (who engage in 
a mixed-strategy equilibrium in the initial investment game).  In the red-colored regions of 
Figure 6, labeled FP , the FP regime is better from the social point of view; these regions 
correspond to parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 7, part (i) of Proposition 8, and the conclusions of 
the analysis of regions  2 C  and  1 B  discussed in the foregoing. Finally, in the blue-colored 
regions of Figure 6, labeled RE , the RE regime dominates patents from the social point of view. 
These regions were described in part (ii) of Proposition 7 and part (ii) of Proposition 8 and in 
the context of the analysis of regions  2 C  and  1 B .  
  The fact that the parameter space in which the RE regime dominates is disjoint exhibits 
one of the simplifying features of our model.  Specifically, the assumption that the entire surplus 
created by the innovation can be extracted by a monopolist patent holder means that there is no 
residual consumer surplus in region  2 B ; and in this region there is no expected profit either 
under the FP regime, although some investment takes place, because the mixed-strategy 
equilibria competes away all the expected profit. Under the RE regime, firms earn zero initial 
expected profits (they also play a mixed strategy in both the initial and the improvement 
games).  But given the Bertrand pricing assumption, consumers can capture some of the benefits 
of innovation here, and thus the RE regime dominates the FP regime in this region.  In other 
words, the limited avenue for R&D benefit spillover to consumers that we allow in our model 
somewhat slants the comparison in favor of the RE regime.  Whereas this result underlies a 
limiting feature of the model (which could, of course, be relaxed, at the cost of making the 
characterization of the results even more cumbersome), it does reinforce the significance of the 
parameter space where we have shown that the FP regime dominates.  
 
5.4. On Licensing 
  In this paper we have assumed that, under both intellectual property regimes, no licensing 
takes place between competing firms.  The type of licensing that we might consider here is for 
the right to carry out R&D (there is clearly no incentive for the Leader and patent holder to 
license the right to produce).  Because licensing is a central theme in studies of cumulative   28
innovation (e.g., Green and Scotchmer, 1995), it might be useful to articulate how licensing 
would affect our results.  First note that, unlike some other quality ladder models in this area, 
here we have assumed that ideas are not scarce in that both the initial innovator and the other 
firm can pursue the follow-on innovation.  But we have also implicitly assumed that firms can 
operate only one project at a time (i.e., each firm has a given stock of R&D capabilities), so that, 
in principle, licensing the ability to perform product-improving R&D might be useful. 
  Under the RE regime, it is clear that there is no scope for licensing because the lagging 
firm has free access to the latest innovation for R&D purposes (or, to put it differently, follow-
on innovations are patentable and non-infringing). Under the FP regime, on the other hand, the 
winner of the initial game would find it profitable to license the right to innovate if the 
monopoly profit from investing in the two separate projects is higher than the profit from a 
single project.  In fact, because in our setting the monopolist captures the entire surplus from 
innovation, this condition is equivalent to whether it is better, from the social point of view, to 
have one or two firms engaged in R&D.8  In part (ii) of Proposition 7 we have shown that two 
firms are better than one i.f.f.  0 (1 ) p xc −≥ Δ . Therefore, in this domain, licensing could occur. 
Because in our setting the monopolist fully internalizes the social benefit of innovation, allowing 
for licensing arrangements would improve the welfare properties of the FP regime without 
affecting the nature of the equilibrium under the RE regime.  We should conclude, therefore, 
that if licensing were allowed in this model the FP regime would weakly dominate the RE in 
every case. But we caution against this overly strong conclusion.  In our model it is not 
particularly meaningful to consider licensing because we do not explicitly model an asymmetric 
information structure, a feature that has been shown to be critical in the licensing of technology, 
especially in a cumulative innovation setting (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Bessen, 2004).   
 
6. Conclusion 
  Recent court decisions have renewed interest, both in the United States and abroad, in the 
question of whether patent law reform should include a statutory research exemption (Merrill, 
Levin, and Myers, 2004; Thomas, 2004; Rimmer, 2005).  Conversely, for the case of plant 
breeder’s rights (an intellectual property right system that already possesses a well-defined 
research exemption), there has been considerable debate on whether the access provided by the 
research exemption should be curtailed (Le Buanec, 2004).  Little economic research on this 
feature of intellectual property rights exists, however.  In this paper we attempt to fill this gap 
in the policy analysis of intellectual property rights by studying the welfare properties of the 
                                                    
8  The presumption that firms can carry out only one project at a time rules out the “invariance” 
effect of Sah and Stiglitz (1987).    29
research exemption and its ability to provide incentives for R&D investment when the 
innovation process is sequential and cumulative.  We develop a dynamic model of production 
and R&D competition in which the cost of the initial innovation effort differs from the cost of 
subsequent improvements. In this framework we derive explicit solutions for the Markov 
perfect equilibria of the investment and improvement games and analyze the social welfare 
properties of full patent and research exemption regimes.  
  Among the findings of the paper, it turns out that the firms themselves always prefer (ex 
ante) the full patent protection regime.  The social ranking of the two intellectual property 
regimes, on the other hand, depends on the relative magnitudes of costs of initial innovation and 
improvements. In particular, there exists a range of improvement cost parameters in which the 
social ordering of the two regimes depends on the magnitude of the initial innovation cost: for 
low values of this initial cost the research exemption regime yields a higher welfare, whereas 
when the initial cost is large the full patent regime is optimal from the social point of view. This 
implies that the research exemption is most likely to provide inadequate incentives when there 
is a large cost of establishing a research program, as is arguably the case for the plant breeding 
industry (where developing a new variety typically takes several years). On the other hand, 
when both initial and improvement costs are small relative to the expected profits (perhaps the 
case of the software industry noted by Bessen and Maskin, 2002), the weaker incentive to 
innovate is immaterial (firms engage in R&D anyway), and the research exemption regime 
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Appendix. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1.   
Consider the situation where the Leader invests with probability one in every period, whereas 
the Follower invests with the same probability  [ ] 0,1 φ ∈  in every period (i.e.,  ( ) 1 L k σ =  and 
( ) F k σ =& ,  k ∀ ). As in the text, the value to the Follower is written as  F V  (this value is 
independent of the state), whereas for the Leader we simplify the notation and write 
() ( ), ( ), kL L F V Vkk k σσ ≡ .  From the recursive equations in (2) and (3) we have 
  [ ] [ ] 11 (1 2 ) +(1 ) (1 ) k kF k k k V k c qV qV q V pV p V φδ δ δ φ δ δ ++ =Δ − + + + − − + −  (31) 
  1 (1 ) (1 )
L
F F F V cq V qV V δδ δ ⎡⎤ =− + +− +− ⎣⎦ &&     .       ( 3 2 )  
Hence, for the Leader we have 
   1 1,2,... kk Vk V k α βγ + =+ + =         
where the parameters α , β  and γ  are defined as follows: 


































Assuming that the following convergence condition holds, 






→          ( 3 3 )  
the general solution to the value of the Leader can be written as 








  .         ( 3 4 )  
Note that, by using (34), the term in the convergence condition (33) reduces to 
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Given that  1 γ < , it follows that  0a s  
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This expression is conditional on  F V , which satisfies (32). But for  1 k =  we have 
  ()
1
11 2( 1 )
1( 1 ) 1( 1 ) 1( 1 )
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&& &
&& &
    .    (36) 
Upon solving the system of equations given by (32) and (36) we obtain: 
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  .    (38) 
Equations (35) and (38) contain the results claimed in Lemma 1.   
 
Proof of Proposition 1.   
Part (i). If both firms invest in every period, then, from the recursive equations (2) and (3), their 
value functions are given by 
( ,) (, 1 )( 12) (,) LF L L V kkc q Vq V k q V k σ δ δσ δσ =Δ −+ + + + −     (39) 
() (, 1 ) 1 F LF V cq V qV δσ δ =− + + −   .        ( 4 0 )  
Consider the Leader first, and suppose that now the Leader deviates by not investing in state s . 
Then its expected payoff is  











=Δ + + − ⇒ =
−−
 .    (41) 
Here,  ˆˆ ( , ) L F σσ σ =  and  ˆ ( )( ) LL k k σσ =  for all ks ≠ .  Assume that  1 s = .  Then the one-stage 
deviation under consideration would be profitable i.f.f.  ˆ ( ,1) ( ,1) LL VV σσ ≥ .  From Lemma 1, 
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  .          ( 4 4 )  
For the purposes of part (i) of Proposition 1 we observe that   34








  .         ( 4 5 )  
Therefore we conclude that deviating by not investing in state  1 s =  cannot be profitable for the 
Leader when  2 cx Δ≤ . Since not investing in state  1 s =  yields a strictly lower payoff to the 
Leader, the Leader will not choose this action with positive probability in any arbitrary 
deviation when the lead is equal to one. Hence we conclude that the Leader has no profitable 
deviation in this state.  Next, by using equation (5) of Lemma 1 we can write  
() ()
()
ˆˆ (, 1 ) (, 1 ) (,) (,)
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
LL L L
pq






+− += − +
−− −−
 .  (46) 
If  ˆ ( ,1) ( ,1) LL VV σσ ≥ , then, because  pq > , it follows by induction that  ˆ ( ,) (,) , LL V kV kk σσ ≥∀ . 
Thus, the Leader does not have a profitable deviation at any stage.  Next consider the Follower.  
Conditional on the Leader investing in every period, the value to the Follower of investing in 
every period is  F V  as given by (43), whereas the value of deviating to not investing in the first 
stage is  () () ˆ FF VV σδ σ = . Hence,  ˆ ( )( ) FF VV σσ ≥  whenever  0 F V ≥  which, from (43), is 
equivalent to  () 2 1( 1) c qq x δδ Δ≤ − − ≡ . 
Part (ii). Because the value of being a Follower does not depend on the state k  of the game, the 
Follower can follow the same stationary strategy at all states. Thus, consider the candidate 
equilibrium profile  () , L F σσ σ ≡  where  [ ] ( )0 , 1 , F kk σφ =∈ ∀  and  ( )1 , L kk σ =∀. From part (i), 
1 = &  i.f.f.  () 2 1( 1) c qq x δδ Δ≤ − − ≡ . For  2 cx Δ<  and close enough to  2 x , suppose that 
() 0,1 ∈ & .  Then, in any one stage, the Follower must be indifferent between actions  I  and  N  
(given that the rest of the game accords with the strategy profile σ ), that is, 
I N
F F V V =  where 
   1 (1 )
I
FF V cq V qV δδ =− + + −  
  
N
FF V V δ =  . 
By using the expressions derived in Lemma 1, we find that 
I N
F F V V =  requires &  to solve the 
quadratic equation (11). Note that  1 → &  as  2 c x Δ→  and  0 → &  as  1 cx Δ→ .  By 
construction, the Follower does not have a one-stage profitable deviation from  ( ), F kk σ φ =∀ .  
As for the Leader, the value of  ( )1 , L kk σ =∀ when the Follower plays  ( ), F kk σ φ =∀  is given 
by  ( , ) L V k σ  in Lemma 1. Deviating at stage s  only by choosing action  N  at that stage yields 
payoff 
ˆ ( ,) ( 1 ) (,) LF L V kk p V p Vk σδ δ σ =Δ + + − &&   .   35
Because, as shown, in the postulated mixed-strategy equilibrium the Follower’s payoff  0 F V = , 
ˆ ( ,) (,) LL V kV k σσ ≥  holds as long as  () ( ,) 1 ( 1 ) L V kk q σδ ≥Δ − − & , which, by using the result of 












    .          ( 4 7 )  
This inequality can be shown to hold for all  [ ] 0,1 ∈ &  that solve equation (11).  Because equation 
(11) applies to  21 x c x ≤Δ ≤, then in this domain the Leader does not have a profitable 
deviation from  ( )1 , L kk σ =∀. 
Part (iii). If  ( )0 , F kk σ =∀ , then the situation is isomorphic to that of the FP protection 
environment and, as established earlier, it is indeed optimal for the Leader to invest whenever 
0 cx Δ≤ .  Given  ( )1 , L kk σ =∀, it follows from the proof of part (ii)  that the Follower does not 
have a profitable one-stage deviation when  1 x c <Δ .  
Part (iv). If the firms play according to the strategy profile ( )( ) 0 , LF k k k σσ == ∀ , then the 







 and  ( ) 0 F V σ = . Suppose that the Leader considers the 
strategy  ˆ () L k σ  such that  ˆ (1) 1 L σ =  and  ˆ ( )( ) 0 ,1 LL kkk σσ == ∀ >  (i.e., the Leader deviates by 
investing in state  1 k =  only). Then the Leader’s expected payoff can be written as 
  ˆ (,, 1 ) (,, 1 )
1





  .       ( 4 8 )  
Thus,  ˆ ( ,, 1 ) (,, 1 ) 0 LLF LLF VV σσ σσ −>  holds i.f.f.  (1) 0 pc δδ Δ− −> , that is i.f.f.  0 / cx Δ< .  We 
conclude that the Leader has no profitable one-state deviation in this case.  Now, for the 
Follower, consider the strategy  ˆ () F k σ  such that  ˆ (1) 1 F σ =  and  ˆ ( )( ) 0 ,1 FF kkk σσ == ∀ >  (i.e., 
the Follower deviates by investing in state  1 k =  only).  Then its expected payoff is given by 
   ˆ (,) (, )
1





     ( 4 9 )  
and again we find that  ˆ ( ,) (,) 0 FLF FLF VV σσ σσ −>  ⇔  0 / cx Δ< .    
 
Proof of Proposition 2  
Part (i). We will show that for each firm it is optimal not to invest, given that its rival does not 
invest.  The winner of the investment game would obtain a payoff equal to  (1 ) δ Δ−, so that the 
payoff from investing in the initial game while the other firm does not invest is   36
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.   (50) 
Therefore such a firm will invest i.f.f.   
















Because here  0 x c <Δ , the best response of such firm is not to invest. 
Part (ii). We will show that no firm can deviate profitably by switching to  0 1 σ = .  Because 
0 / cx Δ≤  by assumption, the payoff of the winner of the investment game is given by the  M V  of 
equation (1) (with  1 k = ). Consider the payoff to the firm from playing  0 1 σ =  given that its 
rival plays  0 0 σ = .  This satisfies  
   00 0 (1) M V cp V p V δδ =− + + −   .        ( 5 1 )  
Therefore such a firm will find it profitable i.f.f.  
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  .    (52) 
Part (iii). Consider the situation in which both firms invest with probability one. Then each 
firm’s value function is given by 
   00 0 (12 ) M V cq V q V δδ =− + + −   .        ( 5 3 )  
Because the firm that does not innovate obtains a zero payoff, both firms invest in equilibrium if  
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    .    (54) 
Part (iv). Because here we have  () 01 cH c Δ≤ Δ , we know from (ii) that in the absence of 
competition each firm will find it profitable to invest. On the other hand, since 
() 02 cH c Δ≥ Δ , we know from (iii) that if its rival is investing a firm will find it profitable not 
to invest. This implies that there exist two pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this domain, which 
require the two firms to behave asymmetrically. But there also exist a pair of mixed strategies 
which, because of their symmetry, may be more appealing. To compute the symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium, suppose that firm 2 randomizes between investing and not with 
probability 0 σ . Then the payoff of firm 1, conditional on investing or not investing, respectively, 
satisfies the following recursive equations:  
   () ( )
11 1
00 0 0 00 (1 2 ) (1 ) (1 ) MM V q V qV p V pV c σδ δ σ δ δ =+ − + − + − −    (55) 
   ()
11 1
00 0 0 0 (1 ) 1 V pV V σδ σ δ =− + −   .        ( 5 6 )    37
From (56) it follows that 
1
0 0 V = . In a non-degenerate mixed-strategy equilibrium each firm is 
indifferent between its two (pure) strategies.  Hence, the second firm’s equilibrium mixing 
probability must satisfy 
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Proof of Proposition 4 
If both firms invest with probability one in the investment game, then the value function of each 
firm is given by 
  00 1 0 (12 ) V cq V q V δδ =− + + −   ⇔  10










On the other hand, if only one firm invests, then its value function is given by 
  00 1 0 (1 )
II V cp V p V δδ =− + + −   ⇔  10










and the value function of the firm that does not invest ( 0
N V ) is equal to zero. Therefore, both 
firms invest in equilibrium i.f.f.  00









.  The last expression can be 
written as  10 q V c δ ≥ .  By using equation (9), which implies that  1 ( ,1) ( ) L V Vc q σδ == , we can 
write this last condition simply as   0 cc ≥ .  By assumption we are limiting consideration to the 
case  0 cc ≤ ; therefore, firms will invest with probability one only when  0 cc = . On the other 
hand, none of the firms invests in equilibrium if  0 0
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 . 
Note that this implies that  5() H x  is a linear function with  51 11 ( )( ) H xH x =  and 
52 32 ( )( ) H xH x =  (see Figure 5).  Finally, if  () 05 cc H c Δ< Δ≤ Δ  then both firms must 
randomize in a symmetric equilibrium. In such a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, if the   38
second firm invests with probability  0 σ , then for the first firm to be indifferent between 
investing and not we must have 













Proof of Proposition 5   
Part (i). If both firms invest with probability one in the investment game, then the value 
function of each firm is given by 












 .  (57) 
On the other hand, if only one firm invests, then its value function is given by 
   00 0 (1 )
II
L V cp V p V δδ =− + + −   ⇔  0
0 1 (1 )








      (58) 
and the value function of the firm that does not invest is given by 
   00 (1 )
N N








.    (59) 
Therefore, both firms invest in equilibrium i.f.f.  
   00
N V V ≥   ⇔  0 ()
1 (1 2 ) 1 (1 )







  . 
By using the expressions for  L V  and  F V  derived earlier, the last expression can be rearranged 
to yield the claimed parametric domain.  
Part (ii). Suppose that a firm faces a rival that does not invest. From (v) we know that such a 






















    ⇔    () 03 cH c Δ≤ Δ .   (60) 
Part (iii).  The results in (i) and (ii) imply that in this case a firm that faces no rival will find it 
optimal to invest. On the other hand, if the rival is investing, then it is optimal not to invest. It 
is clear that the symmetric equilibrium must involve mixed strategies. To compute them, 
suppose that one of the firms invests in each period of the investment stage with 
probability 0 [0,1] σ ∈ . In equilibrium its rival must be indifferent between investing and not. In 
particular, we have 
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and 
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The equilibrium mixing probability must satisfy   00
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  .     (63) 
This defines a quadratic equation in  0 σ  of the form 
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and where  F V  and  ( ,1) LL VV σ ≡  are given by equations (4) and (9), respectively. The 
equilibrium mixing probability is the root of this equation that belongs to the unit interval.  
 
Completion of the Proof of Proposition 6 
Note that (21) is monotonically increasing in  0 σ , achieving its maximum on [0,1] at  0 1 σ = .  
Thus, a sufficient condition for 
FPR E Π> Π in this case is 
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Recalling the expressions for  M V  and  F V  (equation (1) and Lemma 1), and evaluating them at 
0 c , the inequality of interest reduces to 
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Note that the LHS is increasing in c  and the RHS is decreasing in c .  Hence, evaluate both at 
the lower bound  0 c = , so that the resulting sufficient condition simplifies to 
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We can now verify that the inequality is always satisfied because, given that  (0,1) p∈  and 
(0,1) δ ∈ , we have (2)( 1 ) p p δδ −< + −  and   
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Derivation of the Function Wφ  
Suppose that the Leader invests in all periods, and the Follower invests with probability φ  in 
each period.  Let  () Wk φ denote the expected total surplus at stagek . Then we have  
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This can be written as  
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where the parameters α , β , and γ  are defined as 
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The general solution to the value of the Leader can be written as 









Using the definitions of the parameters α , β , and γ   given above, and simplifying for the case 
1 k = , yields 
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